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DESIGNATION OF PARTIES

Pursuant to Rule 24(d), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, appellant Barber
Brothers, Inc., will be referred to herein as "Barber Brothers", Appellee Bronson Foianini
will be referred to herein as "Bronson" and Appellee Kelly Foianini will be referred to
herein as "Kelly".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
The appeal relates to the trial court's decision in a case where car dealer Barber
Brothers asserted breach of contract and fraud claims against Bronson and Kelly in
connection with a motor vehicle transaction. A bench trial occurred and the trial court
found Bronson liable for breach of contract and fraud, but determined that Kelly had not
committed fraud and was jointly and severally liable for only a portion of the amount the
trial court awarded to Barber Brothers.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are set forth in the trial court's findings of fact and reflect the
findings found by the trial court. Unless otherwise stated herein, Appellees agree with
the following facts:
1.

Barber Brothers is a duly licensed motor vehicle dealer under the laws of the

State of Utah having its principal office and place of business in Morgan County, State of
Utah. (R. 427)
2.

Kelly is a resident of the State of Wyoming who transacted business and is

found in the State of Utah. (R. 427)
3.

Bronson is a resident of the State of Wyoming who transacted business and is

found in the State of Utah. (R. 427)
4.

The acts, failures to act, refusals to act, and breaches of duty complained of by

Barber Brothers occurred and took place in most substantial part in Morgan County, State
of Utah. (R.427)
5.

On or about October 23, 2005, Bronson came to the Barber Brothers Ford

dealership in Morgan, Utah, looking to buy a truck. Bronson expressed interest in a 2006
Ford truck and asked the salesperson, Marcie Madigan, what she would give for his 2005
Dodge diesel truck ("Dodge truck"), which he did not have with him. At the time,
Bronson was with his cousin and had arrived in his cousin's vehicle. In response to her
interest in seeing the vehicle, Bronson left the dealership and returned later that day with
his Dodge truck. Ms. Madigan and Dave Rowley, the used car manager, drove the
4

Dodge truck off the lot, giving Barber Brothers an opportunity to evaluate the vehicle.
Bronson admitted on that day, the first day he met with Ms. Madigan, that an unnamed
Barber Brothers employee asked him, "does this [the 2005 Dodge Truck] have a chip on
it?" Bronson replied, "No." (R. 428)
6.

After negotiating the terms of the sale and purchase of the Ford truck, Bronson

left his truck on the Barber Brothers' lot, although the contract on the Ford truck still
needed to be signed and financing approved. Bronson locked his truck and left in his
cousin's vehicle. (R. 428)
7.

Two days later, on October 25, 2005, after his financing had been approved,

Bronson returned to Barber Brothers and purchased the 2006 Ford truck. As part of the
purchase transaction under the Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale, Bronson traded in his
2005 Dodge truck with an odometer reading of 15,800 miles. No warranty existed on the
Dodge truck's engine because the original had been replaced with a rebuilt engine by
Bronson. The original engine was damaged by a computer chip, which is designed to
enhance the engine's performance. (R. 428-29)
8.

After signing his contract, Rick Jackson, Barber Brothers' general sales

manager, looked at Bronson's Dodge truck for the first time. Mr. Jackson's job as
general sales maanger is to value all used vehicles for the dealership. On October 23,
when Barber Brothers valued Branson's truck, it did so by calling Mr. Jackson, who was
in California at a car auction, to get his valuation of the truck. On October 25, 2005, after
Mr. Jackson had returned to the dealership and signed the contract, he desired to look
firsthand at Branson's truck. He went out to the lot where the Dodge truck was parked,
5

and found Bronson and another male in a truck parked directly behind Bronson's truck.
Mr. Jackson expressed to Bronson an interest in looking at the truck and asked for the
keys. Bronson questioned why that was necessary because "the deal had been made."
Without driving the truck, Mr. Jackson got in the truck and observed gauges consistent
with being chipped. Mr. Jackson got out of the truck and asked Bronson, "Does this
truck have a chip on it?" Bronson replied, "No." At that point Mr. Jackson walked to the
rear of the truck and observed the enlarged tailpipe on the truck, which indicated fiirther
evidence of possible chipping. Mr. Jackson asked, "Has it ever had a chip on it?"
Bronson again replied, "No. It's just an exhaust tip." At that point, Mr. Jackson felt
comfortable with the valuation of the vehicle he had earlier given over the telephone in
California because, in his words, "it's hard to get stung with a vehicle under factory
warranty." He went into the store and told Mr. Rowley to continue closing the
transaction. Bronson eventually left later with the new Ford truck. (R. 429)
9.

Some time after the trade-in, the Barber Brothers' employees discovered a

knock in the Dodge truck's engine and an obvious oil leak from the engine. Jeff
Mclntyre, the technician for Barber Brothers, testified that with a cold start, the knock in
the engine was obvious; but with a hot start, the knock was not obvious. This explains
why Ms. Madigan and Dave Rowley heard no knock in the engine when they test drove
the vehicle on October 23, 2005. (R. 430)
10.

The trial court concluded that there was no way that the Dodge truck would

have spontaneously developed an engine knock and have no oil on the dip stick without
Bronson having prior knowledge of the problems. (R. 430)
6

11.

Bronson had explanations of why he did not arrive with his truck and why he

left it at the dealership for two days before he sold the truck, the trial court was not
convinced by his explanation. Rahter the trial court believed Bronson's actions were
indicative of his reluctance to drive the vehicle any more than he needed to before he sold
it. The trial court found that Bronson sold the vehicle to Barber Brothers knowing that
the engine was rebuilt, defective, and leaking oil. (R. 430)
12.

After discovering Bronson's misrepresentations and the true condition of the

Dodge truck's engine, Barber Brothers asked for rescission of the contract or otherwise
gave Bronson a chance to financially respond to the claim. When the parties could not
settle, the Barber Brothers filed this lawsuit. (R. 431)
13.

Kelly signed the contract documents as a co-signer for his son, Bronson.

Though Barber Brothers attempted to show Kelly's knowledge of the defective truck and
his complicity in his son's fraud, the trial court determined the evidence preponderates
that he merely signed the financing papers as an accommodation for his son qualifying
under Ford Credit. (R. 431)
14.

Bronson warranted in writing, as part of the paper transaction, that he had not

removed any of the manufacturer's pollution control equipment. Under the "Conditions
and Warranties" section of the contract, paragraph 12 a), Bronson represented as follows:
"That unless otherwise disclosed on the reverse side hereof, pollution control equipment,
all safety related equipment, installed by the manufacturer has [sic] not been removed or
rendered inoperable." (R. 431-32)
15.

Both representations concerning chipping and the removal of the pollution
7

control equipment were false and were known by Bronson to be false. First, Bronson
made a knowing misrepresentation regarding the chipped engine. Although Bronson
made a true statement, i.e. that the engine on the Dodge truck had not been chipped
because the rebuilt engine did not have a chip on it, that statement was misleading
because he knew that Barber Brothers would assume that the vehicle with an odometer
reading of 15,800 miles would still have the original manufacturer's engine in it,
complete with the 100,000-mile warranty for the power-train (engine, transmission, drive
differentials, transfer case, and cooling system). Accordingly, Bronson had a duty to
qualify his representation that he had replaced the manufacturer's engine, but the existing
rebuilt engine did not have a chip on it. (R. 432)
16.

When Barber Brothers' employee asked Bronson on October 23, if the engine

had been chipped, the court determined that he knew that Barber Brothers asked the
question pertaining to the original engine, because the truck's odometer showed only
15,800 miles. When he represented that the engine had not been chipped, Bronson knew
that Barber Brothers would understand the answer only in the sense that it was false.
Bronson had a duty to disclose the truth about the rebuilt engine or otherwise to clarify
the ambiguous question. (R. 432)
17.

The trial court found that Bronson actively concealed the Dodge truck's

defective engine by controlling when and how Barber Brother's employees would drive
his Dodge truck, thus minimizing the dealership's ability to discover the defective engine.
(R. 433)
18.

Second, Bronson falsely represented and warranted that none of the Dodge
8

truck's manufacturer's pollution control equipment had been removed. Bronson had, in
fact, removed the vehicle's catalytic converter. His explanation that he had forgotten
because such equipment is not required in Wyoming was not persuasive to the trial court.
(R. 433)
19.

In asking whether the engine had been chipped, Bronson knew that Barber

Brothers asked the question to ascertain the true value of the Dodge vehicle, as part of the
trade-in toward the purchase price of the new Ford truck. Bronson knew that if the
engine had not been chipped or not had its catalytic converter removed, he could expect
fair market value for the Dodge truck still under factory warranty. Conversely, he knew
that a truck without the original manufacture's engine warranty, with a rebuilt engine,
and without a catalytic converter would be valued less than fair market value. He did not
disclose the truth, expecting Barber Brothers to act in reliance upon his representation.
According to Chrysler Corporation, any alteration of the vehicle, including chipping,
violates the warranty. (R. 433)
20.

Bronson initially took the vehicle with the chipped damaged engine to a

Chrysler dealership for repair and the problem was diagnosed by Brett Cairrigaa, a
technician, of Carrigan Motors. Mr. Carrigan informed the Chrysler Corporation so that
it could avoid the warranty in case the vehicle was taken to any Chrysler dealership in the
country for warranty work. Thus, had Barber Brothers investigated the Dodge truck,
through its Chrysler dealership in another city, it could have discovered that the vehicle
had a voided engine. Further, the Dodge truck had gauges and an enlarged exhaust pipe
that can also be external evidence of a chipped vehicle. (R. 433-34)
9

21.

Within a few days of taking the vehicle in trade on October 25, 2005, Barber

Brothers discovered the Dodge truck's engine problems and the absence of the catalytic
converter. Barber Brothers made telephone calls and sent letters to Bronson and Kelly
trying to obtain information about the re-built engine and any applicable warranty
information, to give the defendants a chance to inspect the vehicle to satisfy themselves
of the vehicle's problems, and to amicably resolve its claims against both Kelly and
Bronson. In January 2006, Barber Brothers told Kelly and Bronson that it had a potential
buyer who would purchase the vehicle for a price that would resolve the claims. Barber
Brothers asked the defendants for permission to sell the vehicle because of the pending
dispute and because Bronson and Kelly still had not inspected the vehicle. Kelly and
Bronson promised to consult with an attorney and respond to Barber Brothers, but never
did. (R. 434)
22.

Barber Brothers acted reasonably and in ignorance of Bronson's

misrepresentations. Bronson's representations were not obviously false. The presence of
the enlarged tailpipe and gauges can be evidence that a vehicle had been chipped.
However, the presence of gauges, especially on a diesel truck that is often used for
hauling, can also be used to monitor exhaust temperature to prevent overheating.
Likewise, some vehicles have enlarged exhaust pipes for cosmetic styling, sound effect,
and better mileage. Therefore, while external evidence existed to suggest possible
chipping, Barber Brothers acted reasonably in asking Bronson specific questions to
determine the truth about the vehicle. Barber Brothers was not asking Bronson subjective
questions relating to existing material facts. Bronson had no legal alternative except to
10

be forthcoming, and he was not. Moreover, according to Clay Carrigan, another
technician, the only way to actually verify a chipped engine is to pierce the firewall of the
engine's computer system and run test with the exhaust manifold. (R. 434-35)
23.

The trial court found that under all of the circumstances detailed above, Barber

Brothers in fact relied on Bronson's misrepresentations, half-truths, and active
concealment that his Dodge truck was in proper working condition and had never been
chipped and that the truck's engine with its 15,800 miles would still be under warranty.
Barber Brothers also relied on the written warranty that none of the pollution control
equipment, including the catalytic converter, had been removed. (R. 435)
24.

Based on that reliance, Barber Brothers accepted Bronson's Dodge truck in

trade on a new Ford truck and gave him fair market value for a comparably equipped
Dodge truck under factory warranty and with a catalytic converter. Barber Brothers acted
to its financial detriment. In trying to sell the defective truck, Barber Brothers explored
repairing the vehicle for $8,000 out of its own pocket to qualify the vehicle again for a
service contract as a means of still making money on the transaction, but Barber Brothers
concluded that it would still lose money. Under all of the circumstances of this case
Barber Brothers used reasonable efforts to dispose of the vehicle. (R. 435)
25.

After Bronson ignored Barber Brothers' offers to settle the claim, including an

offer to rescind the transaction, Barber Brothers decided to sell the Dodge truck as best it
could. In doing so, it had to advertise the vehicle "as is," which caused potential buyers
to back off when they discovered the problems with the vehicle. Barber Brothers
eventually sold the vehicle on March 27, 2006. (R. 435-36)
11

26.

Paragraph 6 of the "Conditions and Warranties" under the contract provides

that seller may be awarded a reasonable attorney fee to enforce any of the terms,
conditions, or warranties under the contract. Because Barber Brothers seeks to enforce
Branson's breach of his warranty that all pollution control equipment was on the vehicle,
when he had, in fact, removed the catalytic converter, Barber Brothers is entitled to
recover attorney fees for the enforcement of this claim. (R. 437-38)
27.

Additionally, the Court found and concluded, as a matter of law, that Barber

Brothers was entitled to attorney fees in bringing its fraud claim against Bronson, under
authority of Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56. (R. 438)
28.

Through concealment and misrepresentation, Bronson sold a truck with a

defective rebuilt engine that he knew would appear to be under factory warranty to an
unsuspecting Barber Brothers dealership. He also misrepresented under an express
written warranty that he had not removed or altered any of the vehicle's pollution control
devices, when, in fact, he had removed the catalytic converter, contrary to federal
regulations. The evidence of Branson's intent to commit fraud in this case is
overwhelmingly clear and convincing. In fact, the trial court had no reasonable doubt
about his intent. (R. 438-39)
29.

Paragraph 12(a) of the contract warrants that the pollution control equipment

installed by the manufacturer, namely the catalytic converter, had not been removed from
the vehicle. By signing the contract, both Kelly and Bronson made an express warranty
under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-313. The evidence established that Bronson had
removed the catalytic converter. The court concluded that both Bronson and Kelly were
12

liable for breach of an express warranty pertaining to the catalytic converter. In this case,
John Barber, on recall by the defense, testified that a new catalytic converter would cost
$350. The trial court received no evidence of the cost of labor to install the catalytic
converter. Therefore, the trial court limited the judgment for breach of warranty in favor
of Barber Brothers against Kelly and Bronson to the amount of $350. (R. 439)
30.

The trial court entered the following judgment:
1.

The Plaintiff is granted judgment against Defendant Bronson Foianini in

the amounts of:
a. $8,518, which represents the sum of $1,682 in lost profits, $6,506 in
boarding costs, and $350 for breach of warranty;
b. $13,890, which represents $11, 375 in attorneys fees, $2,240 in sanctions,
and $275 in costs; and
c. Post-judgment interest at the legal rate.
2. The Plaintiff is granted judgment against Defendant Kelly Foianini, who is jointly
and severally liable for $4,475 of the above judgment against Bronson Foianini.
This amount represents $1,610 in attorney fees, $275 in costs, $2,240 in sanctions,
and $350 for breach of warranty.
(R. 470-71)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly determined that Kelly's conduct in this case did not
amount to fraud. The appellant's marshalling of evidence fails to demonstrate that the
13

trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of
evidence. Utah Law establishes that a person cannot be found Uable for fraud when the
person does not make the misrepresentations himself, authorize someone to make the
representations for him, or participates in the misrepresentation in some way, and
accordingly Utah law supports the trial court's determination.
The trial court correctly determined that Kelly was not a significant party to the
transaction, but rather that his involvement was merely to cosign the financing
documents. The testimony at trial supports such a finding and indicates that Kelly had no
knowledge that there was anything wrong with the truck at the time it was sold, did not
make representations to the Appellant about the Dodge Truck or authorize Bronson to
make any misrepresentations. Indeed, based upon the evidence presented at trial it
appears unlikely that Kelly knew what representations Bronson had made to the
Appellant. The only law Appellant relies upon is the law of real property, which is
inapplicable in this case.
The trial also court correctly held that Kelly should only be held liable for the
removal of the catalytic converter as he had specifically warranted its existence in the
financing papers.
Lastly, the trial court correctly held that Kelly should not be jointly and severally
liable for all of the damages awarded in this case.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE 1
The Uncontested Facts In This Case Establish That Kelly Should Not Have Been Held
14

Liable for a Fraud

The trial court correctly determined that Kelly's conduct in this case did not
constitute fraud.1 Utah Law requires that in order to establish that a particular finding of
fact is clearly erroneous, "an appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence." In re Estate of
Bart ell, 116 P. 2d 885 (Utah 1989) (internal quotations omitted). See also Chen v.
Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 1195 (Utah 2004) ("In order to challenge a court's factual
findings, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the
finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the
finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below, (internal
quotations omitted)." Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the court below,
the Appellant has failed to show that the "court's findings are so lacking in support as to
be against the clear weight of the evidence." In the trial court's ruling, the trial judge
determined the following:
Kelly Foianini signed the contract documents as a co-signer for his son, Bronson.
Though Barber Brothers tried to show Kelly Foianini's knowledge of the defective
truck and his complicity in his son's fraud, the evidence preponderates that he
merely signed the financing papers as an accommodation for his son qualifying
under Ford Credit.

1

The theory that Kelly is liable because of a fraudulent omission is a novel issue raised
by the Appellant for the first time on Appeal and was not raised by the Plaintiffs during
oral argument. During the trial process, all pleadings, arguments and evidence presented
focused upon the affirmative representations made by Bronson. See Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint If 9.
15

(R. 0303-0304)
The evidence at trial did not establish that Kelly's conduct amounted to fraud. In
fact, the evidence at trial showed that Kelly's only involvement in the transaction
occurred after the deal had been made and was limited to co-signing a loan. The
evidence demonstrated (1) that Kelly was not privy to any conversations or negotiations
regarding the trade-in or value of the truck; (2) that before Kelly ever became involved in
this transaction an agreement had been made and the truck had been test driven and
appraised by Barber Brothers; and (3) that Kelly had no knowledge that there was
anything wrong with the truck at the time it was traded in. The appellants try to equate
knowledge of a previous chip with a "fraudulent omission;" however the Appellant fails
to establish that Kelly knew that there was something wrong with the truck at the time it
was sold, that Kelly had a duty to disclose anything given his limited role in the
transaction, or that Kelly was aware of Bronson misrepresented the condition of the
Dodge Truck.
The evidence showed only that Kelly knew that the truck once had a chip, that the
chip had caused problems, and that Kelly was aware that Bronson had installed a new
engine to repair the problem. Furthermore, the evidence shows that Kelly never drove in
the truck after it had been repaired and Kelly never knew of any problem with the engine
after it had been repaired.
Likewise, the evidence fails to establish that Kelly had any involvement in the
fraud. Because the evidence demonstrates that Kelly was never privy to any
conversation, inspection, or negotiation regarding the Dodge Truck, the trial court's
16

findings are not "so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence."
The clear weight of the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that Kelly merely
signed the financing papers as an accommodation for his son to qualify under Ford
Credit. As such, the trial court correctly held that Kelly should not be held liable for
fraudulent omission.
Utah Case Law
The appellants argue that, where Kelly signed the financing documents, he should
be held Uable for fraud despite not having been privy to any conversations, negotiations,
or discussions regarding the trade-in of the Dodge Truck. However, Utah case law again
supports the trial court's determination. The Utah Supreme Court, in Taylor v. Gasor,
Inc., 607 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 1980), defines fraud as:
The making of a false representation concerning a presently existing
material fact which the representor either knew to be false or made recklessly
without sufficient knowledge, or the omission of a material fact when there is a
duty to disclose, for the purpose of inducing action on the part of the other party,
with actual, justifiable reliance in damage to that party.
In Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 792 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah
Court of Appeals explained that "a person cannot be liable for fraud unless he made the
false representations himself, authorized someone to make them for him, or participated
in the misrepresentation in some way, such as through a conspiracy."2
Based upon the Court's holding in Israel Pagan Estate, in order for Kelly to be
liable for fraud, the evidence would have to show that Kelly knew there was a problem
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that the standard of proof for proving a
conspiracy is more than a mere preponderance of the evidence and that it must be proven
by clear and convincing evidence. See Crane v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872 (1978).
17

and that he either made the false representation himself, authorized Bronson to make the
representation for him, or that he participated in the misrepresentation in some way, such
as through a conspiracy with Bronson. The evidence does not establish that Kelly ever
spoke with anyone from Barber Brothers regarding the trade-in vehicle, authorized
Bronson to speak on his behalf, or participated in the misrepresentation in anyway.
Furthermore, because Kelly was only aware of repairs having been made to the Dodge
Truck and had not been in the truck thereafter, the evidence does not demonstrate that
Kelly knew Bronson's truck had any problems at the time it was traded in.
In addition to a requirement of participation, the Court of Appeals in Israel Pagan
Estate set forth that mere circumstantial evidence is not enough to establish fraud, in fact,
if there is evidence consistent with good faith and honest dealings, the court should
construe the facts as such. Id. at 792. The Court explained:
It is not sufficient that the circumstances lead to a mere suspicion of fraud,
nor are they sufficient where they are as consistent with honesty and good faith as
with fraud. When the proved or omitted facts are consistent with any reasonable
theory of good faith and honest intent, they should be so construed. Fraud cannot
be inferred or presumed from ambiguous evidence.. .When it is sought to prove
fraud by circumstantial evidence, the fraud must be such as would reasonably and
naturally follow from the circumstances so proved, and fraud will not be lightly
inferred Id. (citing C.J.S. Fraud § 115 (1943)).
Rather than a conclusion of fraud, the evidence supports a finding of good faith
and honest dealings on the part of Kelly. As has been mentioned, Kelly was a relative
late comer to the transaction and involved only for the purposes of buoying
up Bronson's credit. Kelly was never privy to any discussion, negotiation, or dealings
regarding the trade-in vehicle. He merely signed the financing documents in order to

18

help his son qualify for a loan.
Because Utah law and the evidence support the trial court's determination, the trial
court did not err when it found Kelly not liable for fraud or misrepresentation.
Duty to Disclose
The Appellant attempts to establish that Kelly had some legal duty to disclose his
knowledge of previous problems with the truck and therefore that he should be held
jointly and severally liable for Bronson's fraud. Appelant relies upon a case involving the
purchase of real property. The appellant relies upon the Utah Supreme Court's decision
in Elder v. Clawson, 384 P.2d 802 (Utah 1963). In Elder, the Court held a real estate
agent and property owner liable for fraud when they both knowingly failed to disclose to
the buyers a quarantine on a parcel of farm land. See Id, However, the facts in Elder
differ greatly from the present case and should be deemed inapplicable.
In Elder the Court noted that the knowledge of the prospective purchaser and of
the seller play an important roles in detennining whether fraud exists. Since the purchaser
of the farm land in Elder had no knowledge of farming or of the industry and relied
solely on the advice and knowledge of the owners and their real estate agent and because
of seller and real estate agent's involvement in the transaction and superior knowledge of
the industry, the Court in Elder held that the owner and agent had a special duty to inform
the buyers. See Id. The same does not apply to Kelly as his knowledge was limited and
not superior to that of the Barber Brothers and his involvement was limited to merely
signing the financing papers. The evidence indicates that Kelly is a Rancher and that
Barber Brothers, as an auto dealer, had superior knowledge of the automobile industry.
19

The evidence also demonstrates that prior to Kelly's involvement; Barber Brothers not
only appraised the truck but also took the truck for a test drive. Clearly the facts involved
in Elder are not analogous to those in the case at hand and the Barber Brothers cannot be
considered analogous to the uneducated buyers in Elder.
Additionally, similar to the Court's holdings in Israel Pagan Estate, the only
parties held liable in Elder where those directly involved in the conversations, the
inspections, and the negotiations. The agent and the owner both showed the purchasers
around the property and purposefully and knowingly failed to inform the buyers of
quarantine. In this case, Kelly was not involved at all in the demonstration of the Dodge
Truck; Kelly was not privy to any of the conversations, inspections, or negotiations;
instead, as the trial court noted, Kelly was only involved to help his son qualify
financially. Kelly was not in the same position as the owner or real estate agent in Elder
and therefore this case in inapplicable.
The Appellant has not cited a single statute or case which would support holding a
mere co-signer liable for the purchaser's misrepresentations of a trade-in vehicle. Indeed,
such a holding would be contrary to public policy in that it would chill the automobile
sales industry by severely discouraging individuals from cosigning credit applications in
light of their forced acceptance of the purchaser's potential misrepresentations.
Rule 52(a)
The Appellant argues that because the trial court failed to make a finding of fact
regarding whether Kelly was physically present at the dealership when he signed the
finance papers, the trial court's ruling should be reversed for error. The appellants rely
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on Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that, "in all actions
tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon..." In addition the appellants
note that the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "it is well settled that the trial court should
make findings on all material issues tried by the parties, and a failure to do so is generally
considered a reversible error and requires a remand." Kinkella v. Baugh^ 660 P.2d 233,
236 (Utah 1983). The appellant, however, fails to establish that this disputed fact was a
material issue in this case. Whether Kelly was at the dealership or at home when he
signed the document is of little consequence. The findings of the trial court addressed the
material issue when they determined that Kelly's involvement was after the negotiations
had concluded and was limited to "merely signing the financing papers as an
accommodation for his son. Even if the court had adopted the Barber Brothers account of
the transaction (e.g. finding that Kelly was present at Barber Brother's at the time of
signing), there still exists no nexus between Kelly's involvement in the transaction and
the alleged fraud by Bronson, thus making Kelly's whereabouts immaterial. Because this
issue is not material, failure to determine the absolute whereabouts of Kelly at the time he
signed the documents should not be considered a reversible error.
Catalytic Converter
The trial court did not err in holding Kelly only liable for breach of warranty with
regards to the removal of the catalytic converter. Although no evidence was presented at
trial which would suggest that Kelly knew that the catalytic converter had been removed,
the trial court held that because the financing documents that Kelly signed specifically
21

warranted that no emissions equipment had been removed, Kelly must be held liable for
Branson's removal of the catalytic converter. The financing papers, however, mentioned
nothing regarding the chip or the engine and did not warrant that any other portion of the
truck, beyond the specifically mentioned pollution and safety equipment had not been
altered or repaired. Because no evidence presented would suggest that Kelly knew about
any current problems with the truck and because the contract which he signed did not
unconditionally warrant the condition of the truck, the trial court correctly held that Kelly
was only liable for the missing catalytic converter and not for Branson's
misrepresentation of the truck.
ISSUE 2
The Trial Court did not Err when it Chose not to Award Plaintiffs Requested Amount for
Costs and Attorney Fees
Although appellant claims in its Statement of Issues Presented for Review that the
issue of attorney's fees has been raised on appeal, Appellant fails to address the issue at
all in the body of its brief The Utah Supreme Court has determined that the "calculation
of reasonable attorney's fees is in the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be
overturned on the absence of a showing of clear abuse of discretion." Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (1988). The Court has further held that because the question
of attorney's fees depends largely upon the context of the case, it is appropriate to leave
the determination to the sound discretion of the trial court. RT. Nielson Co, v. Cook, 40
P.3d 1119 (2002). As has been set forth in both the Appellant's Brief and this Brief, the
burden of challenging the trial court's findings related to attorney's fees falls squarely
22

upon the shoulders of the Appellant. In order to have properly presented this issue, the
Appellant would have had to marshal all of the evidence related to the trial court's
findings and have presented it in a light most favorable to the court below. See Chen at
1195. Rather than doing this, the Appellant has not presented any evidence nor has it
cited any support for its claim. In so doing the Appellant has failed to demonstrate how
the trial court erred and/or why this Court should overrule the trial court's determination.
As such, the issue of attorney's fees has not been properly presented to this Court and
should not be considered on appeal.
Furthermore, pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Appellees request that upon dismissal of this appeal or affirmation of the trial courts
determinations, the Appellees be awarded all costs an attorney's fees incurred in
defending this appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing facts and legal arguments, Kelly Foianini requests that this
Court affirm the holding of the trial court. Kelly Foianini also requests the costs and
attorney fees he has incurred in defending this appeal.
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